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Out of Many, One: Discovering
the Shared Statutory Speech Community
Through Corpus Linguistics
Clarity depends on context, which legislative history may
illuminate. The process is objective; the search is not for
the contents of the authors’ heads but for the rules of
language they used.1
– Judge Frank Easterbrook
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INTRODUCTION
Law is communication,2 and communication requires the participation of two or more parties. In the legal context, these parties
are the legislature and the public. The language that the national
legislature (i.e., Congress) produces, including floor statements,
debates, bills, resolutions, and motions proposed, is conveniently
collected in the Congressional Record.3 But this record is often controversial—causing perhaps the deepest divide in judicial philosophy
for at least the past half-century—as judges, attorneys, and
academics debate the merits of turning to this legislative history.
One of the chief criticisms of using legislative history to form
interpretive opinions is that it amounts to little more than “looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends.”4 And some of the most
vehement criticism is reserved for the assumption that Congress
2. See, e.g., Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the
Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE
LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). But see Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary
Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1614
(2014) (noting that asserting law is communication is an incomplete theory). While “[s]ome
have suggested that statutes are particular kinds of communicated meanings—commands
to judges and citizens”—this theory is “true but incomplete” because “[s]uch a view
imagines law made from ‘nowhere.’” Id. Every statute is surrounded by “an electoral and
procedural context.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Thus, “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that,
without that context, democracy evaporates. A statute’s legitimacy in our constitutional
order depends upon context: that the law is the product of an elective, democratic process
rather than autocratic fiat.” Id.
3. The Congressional Record, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative
/congrecord.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Congressional Record].
4. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal).
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had any intent on a specific issue, the argument being that meaning
is found “not in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in
the understanding of the objectively reasonable person.”5
On one extreme of this debate, a minority advocates never
consulting legislative history; on the other, another minority advocates always consulting it, even if the text is otherwise plain.6 The
vast majority of interpreters, however, fall somewhere between
these two extremes. Because most of these interpreters acknowledge that the text is the primary source of law and the clearest
indication of legislative intent,7 the debate surrounding statutory
interpretation has focused principally on just one of the
communicating parties—the public, as measured by ordinary
public meaning—to the neglect of the other party—the legislature,
as measured by legislative intent.8
But legislative intent can be approximated without focusing on
the more controversial aspects of using legislative history. Specifically, the interpreter can more closely approximate legislative
intent by focusing on the semantic context contained in legislative
history. Indeed, a better understanding of speech communities
reveals that merely focusing on the ordinary public meaning is
unnecessary and insufficient.
Still, for the vast majority of interpreters, legislative history is a
helpful supplement in cases of statutory ambiguity. In such
instances, some uses of legislative history are more controversial
than others. Perhaps the most controversial use is to determine the
actual meaning Congress intended the statute to have, even if the
statutory text is otherwise plain. A less controversial use is to have
5. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 32 (1997) (“That a majority of both houses of Congress . . .
entertained any view with regard to such issues is utterly beyond belief. For a virtual
certainty, the majority was blissfully unaware of the existence of the issue, much less had any
preference as to how it should be resolved.”).
6. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 222 (2d ed. 2009).
7. Id.
8. There are legitimate reasons for focusing on the public: “[I]t assures notice to the
public, protects reliance interests, assures consistency of application, and respects the will of
the legislative body.” Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127
YALE L.J. 788, 793 (2018).
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legislative history determine the context surrounding the debate
and passage of the statute.9
This Note highlights an important but neglected contextual use
of legislative history—determining the semantic usage employed
by Congress when passing a law. This Note also proposes that this
is simultaneously the use of legislative history least subject to
criticism and most likely to illuminate the meaning of the text. True,
these uses are still subject to other criticisms of legislative history,
such as “salt[ing] the record.”10 So a better approach for determining semantic context might be to look at more than just the
debate immediately surrounding the statute in question.11 When a
speaker is involved in a debate, the speaker will be more careful
about word choice, which means the speaker’s word choice is less
likely to convey meaning in the ordinary sense.12 Thus, looking to
the way Congress uses the disputed word or phrase in other
debates may illuminate an ordinary congressional usage, or at least

9. See Nourse, supra note 2, at 1614.
10. “[T]o the degree that judges are perceived as grasping at any fragment of

legislative history for insights into congressional intent, to that degree will legislators be
encouraged to salt the legislative record with unilateral interpretations of statutory
provisions they were unable to persuade their colleagues to accept.” JOHN F. MANNING &
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & REGULATION 153–54 (2d ed. 2013) (quoting Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
Justice Kavanaugh expanded on the salting the record criticism: “as a functional matter,
committee reports and floor statements too often reflect an effort by a subgroup in
Congress—or, worse, outside of it—to affect how the statute will subsequently be interpreted
and implemented, in ways that Congress and the President may not have intended.” Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2149 (2016) (reviewing
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
11. Many judges have looked to the term’s usage in the broader statutory scheme to
understand the congressional meaning of the term. For example, Judge Easterbrook, an
ardent textualist, admits that “legislative intent is a vital source of meaning even though it
does not trump the text[,]” in situations when “doubt about the meaning of a term found in
the statute could well be resolved by harmonizing that provision with the structure of the
rest of the law, understood in light of a contemporaneous explanation.” In re Sinclair, 870
F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989).
12. An analysis of the speaker’s language outside the debate could be much more
fruitful. Cf. Jennifer L. Mascott, The Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1557,
1558–59 (noting that dictionaries define words (the debate) but also use those same words to
define other words (usage outside debate)). Dictionary definitions are subject to bias on the
part of the definer. Similarly, a congresswoman might alter language, even inadvertently, in
a given situation, but there would be no alteration in the course of a different conversation.
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help determine the range of possible congressional usages of
the term.
In this manner, the legislative history can be treated as a
specialized dictionary of possible congressional lexical usage, just
as a dictionary lists the possible usages for a given word. But by
using the Congressional Record to determine ordinary congressional
usage, the interpreter runs the risk of falling into the same fallacies
as those who use dictionaries to determine ordinary meaning.13 So
what is the weary traveler in search of statutory meaning to do?
Comb the vast desert of the Congressional Record for other uses of
the disputed term? This would be a monumental task, at best, and
an invitation for the interpreter to scan over the crowd looking for
friends, at worst.
This Note proposes that the Congressional Record be used as a
mini-corpus14 as part of the emerging field of law and corpus
linguistics.15 Thus far, corpus linguistics in the legal setting has
principally been used to study the public’s speech community to
determine the ordinary public meaning.16 So, this Note proposes
studying the legislature’s speech community with a corpus of the
13. See id. at 1558 (“The idea is that by studying the context of how a word is used in
natural language the interpreter can acquire a more unbiased picture of ‘ordinary meaning’
than by consulting dictionaries—written for the express purpose of inviting ‘linguistic
scrutiny.’” (footnotes omitted)).
14. See id. at 1559, for a discussion on the benefits of “mini-corpora.” A mini-corpus
focuses on a specific speech community, as opposed to a general corpus, which “contain[s]
a wide variety of documents such as letters, newspapers, pamphlets, and speeches—
representing the language usage of a large community.” Id. Thus, a mini-corpus is
“specialized, focusing just ‘on a particular linguistic community, such as a particular region, type
of language user, or genre of language.’” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Lee
& Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 830–31 (“Special corpora are limited to a particular genre,
register, or dialect[,]” while general corpora “represent the language used by a broad (often
national) speech community.” (emphasis omitted)).
15. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 863–64 (“We have not sought to study intended
meaning in our corpus analysis. But as noted above we think such a study is possible. One
approach would be to think of interpreter as a term used by lawmakers, and to look for
evidence of usage in this speech community. If we assembled such evidence, then we could
have the debate flagged above—as to whether intended meaning should win out over public
meaning, or whether they ought to collapse together as a matter of theory.”).
16. Ordinary public meaning corpora include the Corpus of Historical American
English (COHA) and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), among
others. CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., https://corpus.byu.edu/coha (last visited Jan. 19 2019)
[hereinafter COHA]; CORPUS CONTEMP. AM. ENG., https://corpus.byu.edu/coca (last visited
Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter COCA].
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Congressional Record to determine ordinary congressional meaning.17 And just as some have proposed using the dictionary as a
corpus,18 my proposed Congressional Record as Corpus (CRAC)
would provide the interpreter with an empirically based range of
possible ordinary meaning.19 Thus, the interpreter avoids scanning
over a crowd to pick out friends because the crowd’s disparate
voices unite into a single reference point.20
By comparing and contrasting the public’s speech community
with the legislature’s speech community, the interpreter can study
the resulting shared statutory speech community. By checking the
respective public and congressional registers, we can know if a
term is more “ordinary” or more “congressional.” Hopefully, the
term will have similar senses in the respective registers;21 however,
even if each register offers a distinct sense of the term, comparing
the two registers still promotes transparency22 in interpretation by
clearly showing the interpreter that a choice must be made between
two competing and overarching values: promoting notice or
respecting legislative intent.23
17. While the theory has been noted in passing by other authors, a method for
implementing a corpus based on congressional meaning has not been proposed until now.
See supra note 15.
18. See Mascott, supra note 12.
19. The difference between a non-corpus versus a corpus approach to ordinary
meaning is significant: “The first scenario is a metaphysical debate; the second is an empirical
one. . . . [T]he corpus method removes the determination of ordinary meaning from the black
box of the judge’s mental impression and renders the discussion of ordinary meaning one of
tangible and quantifiable reality.” Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress:
Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915,
1970 (2010).
20. Similar to how a dictionary’s disparate definitions can be united into a single minicorpora. See Mascott, supra note 12, at 1559.
21. Cf. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 875 (noting that corpus analysis is contextual
within a particular register at a particular time). Ideally the two senses of meaning—intended
meaning and public meaning—overlap completely.
22. See id. at 858 (“[W]e will simply say for now that transparent answers are better
than opaque ones. Further thinking on this problem is needed. Yet surely we will be better
off with an open, transparent discussion about whether (and when) to give primacy to
intended meaning and when to credit public meaning. Once we speak more carefully about
the meaning we are looking for and proceed more reliably in trying to measure it, we can
have a better dialogue about these difficult questions of legal theory.”)
23. Such weighing of competing values, interests, and rights is the reason technological tools such as corpus linguistics will never replace judges. Cf. Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Corpus Linguistics and Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503, 1517 (2017) (“[J]ustice may only
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Part I of this Note explains how congressional intent fits within
interpretive theory. It also analyzes why congressional intent is
important and how it differs from ordinary public meaning. Part II
explores contextual uses of legislative history—one of the main
evidences of congressional intent—for those uses that help reveal
the context surrounding a given statute. Part III advocates using the
Congressional Record as a mini-corpus, which will optimize the use
of legislative history while potentially resolving textualist criticisms of its use. In Part IV, this congressional meaning mini-corpus
is applied to Muscarello v. United States24 and then compared with
the results of an ordinary public meaning corpus. This Note
concludes by encouraging the creation of a full congressional
meaning corpus to analyze the shared statutory speech community.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: WHY BOTH PUBLIC MEANING
AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT MATTER
Communication is the “process by which information is
exchanged between individuals through a common system of
symbols, signs, or behavior[.]“25 Statutory law is fundamentally a
form of communication—Congress speaks, and the public hears.26
And as communication, law shares its “fundamental problem”:
“reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a
message selected at another point.”27 This reproduction problem in
the legal context is called interpretation—the process of

be meted out by people. By replacing the case-by-case exercise of human judgment with a
mechanical calculus, we do not judge better or more objectively, nor do we judge worse.
Instead, we cease to judge at all.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Corpus linguistics merely increases transparency and highlights interpretive questions that
have previously remained hidden. Only humans are capable of passing “the test of a firstrate intelligence[:] the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and
still retain the ability to function.” F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up, ESQUIRE: CLASSIC (Feb. 1,
1936), https://classic.esquire.com/the-crack-up.
24. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
25. Communication, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/communication (last visited Jan. 9, 2019).
26. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 815–16; Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative
Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 485–86 (2013).
27. C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379,
379 (1948).
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understanding what the author(s) intended to communicate.28
Statutory interpretation is a search for the meaning of a text, and
“[t]o assess meaning, . . . we must also take into account the
relevant speech community . . . .”29 These laws are made up of
individual words that only gather meaning through context.30
In other words, language does not exist in a vacuum; it requires
a common group of speakers and hearers known as a speech
community. A speech community is any group of people sharing a
common set of linguistic norms and expectations about how their
language should be used.31 Just as language requires a speech community, statutes require an interpretive community. This shared
statutory speech community is comprised of both the congressional speech community and the public speech community. The
judiciary is then tasked with interpreting the shared statutory
speech community’s conversations, specifically the legislature’s
statutory “symbols.” When doing so, the judiciary has traditionally
focused on determining meaning through what an ordinary
member of the public would understand.32
Focusing on ordinary meaning requires an initial choice: whose
ordinary meaning to choose? In this context, the question is which
speech community’s ordinary meaning to choose—the public’s or
the legislature’s?33 The promotion of either community offers a
28. Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539,
539 (2013).
29. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 818.
30. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 70 (2006). Thus, language correlates to many legal principles, because it likewise cannot
exist in a vacuum. For example, property rights only exist in relation to another person. Just
like a castaway’s “property rights” are illusory, so too are any “statutes” that the castaway
might create. See W ILLIAM LILLIE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 259 (2003).
31. GEORGE YULE, THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 284 (6th ed. 2016).
32. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188 (1824) (“The enlightened patriots who framed
our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”); see also ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012)
(“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.”).
33. Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2059–
60 (2005). This decision has enormous “implications for the selection of a relevant corpus[,]”
because “[i]f we are trying to measure intended meaning, we might want to gather data from
a corpus of a community of speakers who look demographically like Congress. Yet if we are
interested in public meaning, we would want to turn to a broader corpus.” Lee & Mouritsen,
supra note 8, at 858.
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distinct benefit: analyzing the public promotes “the notice function
of the law” while analyzing the legislature promotes “deference to
the presumed intent of the lawmaker.”34 But focusing exclusively
on either speech community is incomplete. Only by comparing the
two halves of the shared statutory speech community can the
interpreter accurately capture ordinary meaning.
A. Ordinary Public Meaning
The law is “a solemn expression of legislative will. It orders and
permits and forbids. It announces rewards and punishments. Its
provisions generally relate not to solitary or singular cases, but to
what passes in the ordinary course of affairs.”35 It is neither merely
a passive hearing on the part of the audience nor a vain expression
on the part of the legislature. Rather, it is a declaration that is meant
to be obeyed. Thus, what the audience understands by a given
statute is vital to determining what that statute means.
There are two main reasons judges and scholars have tended to
focus only on ordinary public meaning. First, preserving notice
values requires that meaning be determined by the public’s
ordinary vernacular and usage.36 Second, relying on ordinary
public meaning avoids the problem of searching for the collective
intent of a multimember body.37 Justice Frankfurter wrote that
[i]f a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not
to assume that Congress intended its words to be read with the
minds of ordinary men . . . . And so we assume that Congress uses

34. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 788. There are many additional reasons for using
the ordinary public meaning. Using ordinary public meaning “assures notice to the public,
protects reliance interests, assures consistency of application, and respects the will of the
legislative body.” Id. at 793. But it is important to note that textualists do not advocate the
plain or ordinary meaning as part of “a silly belief that texts have timeless meanings divorced
from their many contexts[.]” In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989). Nor do they
“assum[e] that what is plain to one reader must be clear to any other (and identical to the
plan of the writer)[.]” Id. Rather, the use of ordinary meaning rests “on the constitutional
allocation of powers.” Id.
35. Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. CIV.
CODE arts. 1, 2 (1933)).
36. Alexander, supra note 28, at 541–42.
37. Id. at 542.
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common words in their popular meaning, as used in the common
speech of men.38

Thus, ordinary public meaning is important because the public, as
Congress’s audience, is required to obey the statutes passed.
Passing and enforcing a law that is substantively or practically
unintelligible to the public is unconscionable.
The traditional understanding of ordinary meaning is that it is
an absolute term which does not permit multiple “ordinary meanings” in a given context, although there may be several possible
meanings. And ordinary meaning has traditionally been viewed as
more important than possible meaning. Justice Scalia stated that the
Court’s job “is to determine . . . the ordinary meaning[,]” rather
than to “‘scavenge the world of English usage to discover whether
there is any possible meaning.’”39 He also lamented that “[t]he
Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word
can be used and how it ordinarily is used.”40 The problem is that
“[l]egal interpretation is binary in nature and requires a ‘yes’ or ‘no’
answer to resolve the legal dispute at issue.”41
Recent scholarship, however, has advocated searching for
ordinary meanings in the plural. One scholar, Jennifer Mascott, has
queried, “Perhaps the proper question . . . [is] not whether English
language speakers more frequently associate [a term] with [one
meaning or another]. Maybe instead the court should have asked,
what are all of the ordinary meanings of [the term] that fit properly
within the statutory context?”42 This “multiple ordinary meanings
38. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
536 (1947). But the audience is not always “ordinary folk.” Compare Justice Frankfurter’s
statement in the same article: “If they are addressed to specialists, they must be read by
judges with the minds of the specialists.” Id.
39. Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1953 (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (emphasis removed).
40. Id. at 1948 n.185 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
41. Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017
BYU L. REV 1417, 1435 (2017). This binary nature at times conflicts with linguistic
understanding: “If, for example, the dispute involves a matter of categorization (e.g., is a
Segway a vehicle?), the court must give a definitive answer even if language experts indicate
that category membership among ordinary language users is properly viewed as a matter of
degree.” Id.
42. Mascott, supra note 12, at 1557.
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approach” poses significant ramifications for statutory interpretation. If both senses of a term are ordinary, then perhaps the
statute encompasses both.43 “In other words,” Mascott continues,
“ordinary meaning might not mean picking the most common use
of a term but rather, identifying the full range of actions encompassed by the permissible meanings of that term.”44 But whether
the interpreter is looking for a single ordinary meaning or a range
of meaning, ordinary meaning is, in essence, “an empirical
question—about the sense of a word or phrase that is most likely
implicated in a given linguistic context.”45
The interpretive framework that most limits inquiry into
congressional intent is textualism,46 which is closely tied to
ordinary public meaning.47 Textualism can be broken down into
two propositions: (1) there is no such thing as an authorial intent
beyond the words of a statute, and (2) the only intent we should
attribute to Congress is what the reasonable person would
understand from the words of that statute.48 I readily agree with the
former proposition. After all, the statutory text is unique in having
survived the constitutionally mandated procedures of bicameralism and presentment.49 But I disagree with the second proposition—

43. See id.; see also Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 804–05 (discussing the dissent’s
opinion in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012) that either of two
common senses of a term could count as ordinary).
44. Mascott, supra note 12, at 1588.
45. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 795.
46. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509,
1516 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997)) (“I don’t care what [the legislature’s] intention was. I only want to
know what the words mean.”).
47. Id. at 1512.
48. See Manning, supra note 30, at 73.
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 65 (“Imagine how
we would react to a bill that said, ‘From today forward, the result of any opinion poll among
members of Congress shall have the effect of law.’ We would think the law a joke at best,
unconstitutional at worst. This silly ‘law’ comes uncomfortably close, however, to the
method by which courts deduce the content of legislation when they look to subjective
intent.”). Justice Scalia wrote that
[t]he greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by
laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: “The law as it
passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will
is spoken is in the act itself . . . .”
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Aldridge v.
Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1844)).
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limiting our inquiry to what the reasonable person would understand from the words of a statute—for two reasons.
First, Congress may have a different vernacular and word
usage than the ordinary public. Second, if we also care about the
will of the lawmaker and not just about protecting reliance interests
and giving notice, we should care about any possible distinct
language usage between the congressional speech community and
the public speech community. Focusing on either half of the shared
statutory speech community to the exclusion of the other is
problematic because our concern for determining the shared
understanding of a text means that the relevant speech community
encompasses both the public and the legislature. The public does
not pass its own laws, and the legislature does not pass laws merely
for its own benefit.
B. Ordinary Congressional Meaning
The judiciary has traditionally focused on determining meaning through what an ordinary member of the public would
understand. But by focusing on one-half of the speech
community—the public—the interpreter forgets that the shared
statutory speech community also includes Congress, not just the
public. Thus, this Note proposes that the ordinary congressional
meaning better incorporates another of statutory interpretation’s
primary goals—giving effect to the will of the lawmaker.
Congressional intent is central to interpretation in several
aspects. First, our judicial system has traditionally focused on
giving credit to the will of the lawmaker.50 Indeed, the statutory

50. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13
(1981) (“The key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature.”); Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Lee,
778 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“In an effort to discern Congress’s intent, this court looks
to ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’”) (citation omitted); 1256 Hertel Ave. Assocs.,
LLC v. Calloway, 761 F.3d 252, 259 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is also ‘fundamental . . . to effectuate
the intent of the Legislature.’”) (citation omitted); Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413,
418 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Congress’s intent guides our interpretation of statutes.”); Cruz v. Abbott,
849 F.3d 594, 599 n.8 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Texas courts aim to give effect to legislative
intent . . . .”); Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 875 F.3d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 2017)
(“[I]n construing statutes, our primary goal is to effectuate legislative intent.”) (citation
omitted); Sutula-Johnson v. Office Depot, Inc., 893 F.3d 967, 976 (7th Cir. 2018) (“We turn to
the general rules of statutory interpretation in Illinois, where the ‘fundamental rule of
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interpretation debate is really about the best way of reaching
Congress’s intent. Whether the Court finds Congress’s intent in the
text, the legislative history, or the legislative purpose, the Court’s
goal is always to give effect to the will of the lawmaker.51
Second, the will of the lawmaker is important as a matter of
social contract theory52—the sovereign (the people) grants
authority to a body (a constitutional convention, Congress, etc.) to
enact rules.53 Those rules (representing the sovereign’s will) are
meaningless if that body’s intent is not carried out.
Further, focusing on the speaker as well as the hearer is
important,54 in part because the public expects Congress to speak
as Congress and not as an ordinary person.55 Indeed, “‘[t]here may

statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’”) (citation
omitted); Heavenly Hana LLC v. Hotel Union & Hotel Indus. of Haw. Pension Plan, 891 F.3d
839, 844 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e examine the legislative history, the statutory structure, and
‘other traditional aids of statutory interpretation’ in order to ascertain congressional intent.”)
(citation omitted); Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is our
primary task in interpreting statutes to determine congressional intent . . . .”) (citation
omitted). But see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 32, at 397 (“Intentionalist theorists and courts
promote the idea that enacted texts merely evoke or suggest—as opposed to state—what the
true law is. This [is a] fallacy . . . .”). At the risk of offending the legal citation pantheon, I am
choosing to leave this string cite organized by circuit rather than year. However, I am not yet
ready to join the angry mob in “burn[ing] all copies of the Bluebook[.]” Richard A. Posner,
What Is Obviously Wrong with the Federal Judiciary, Yet Eminently Curable, 19 GREEN BAG 2d
187, 193 (2016).
51. See cases cited supra note 50, for various approaches to reaching the legislature’s intent.
52. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651) (positing that to avoid a “solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish and short” life, free men enter into a social contract to subject themselves
to a sovereign, either a single person or an assembly); J OHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT (1690) (noting that people delegate some rights to government to preserve the
rights of all); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (1762)
(noting that laws created by governments must be in accordance with general will of
sovereign populace).
53. “In free Governments the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors &
sovereigns.” BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 398
(Ralph L. Ketcham ed., 1965).
54. “[T]he notion of speaker’s meaning derived from the philosophy of language,
which focuses on the meaning the speaker intended to convey to her audience based on the
audience’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intentions.” Nourse, supra note 2, at
1624 n.44; see H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, in 4
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 225, 225, 230 (1968).
55. The “ordinary person” is, of course, a legal fiction. Cf. Weinbaum v. City of Las
Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The objective or reasonable observer is kin to
the fictitious ‘reasonably prudent person’ of tort law.”). Or, from a more colloquial source:
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be good reasons for a legal system to prefer’ either public meaning
or intended meaning. And ‘neither has to win every time,’ because
the ‘right’ answer ‘depends on our reasons’ for the resort to
ordinary meaning ‘in the first place.’”56 Language is inherently tied
to context. For example, we interpret language differently when
interviewing for a job as compared to speaking with a friend, just
as we interpret language differently when reading Shakespeare as
compared to reading Dr. Seuss—depending on the context, we
expect a different conversation. So if Congress has a different
vernacular and usage than the general public, and if we care about
the will of the lawmaker—not just protecting reliance interests and
notice—we should care about those possible distinctions in
language usage.
The choice between ordinary public meaning and ordinary
congressional meaning has real-world consequences: “When the
legal system decides to rely on the ordinary meaning of a word, it
must also determine which interpretive community’s understanding it wishes to adopt.”57 The two principal communities are
the public and the legislature. The public’s speech community is
likely to be reflected in articles, newspapers, books, conversations,
etc. But where does the interpreter find Congress’s speech
community represented? The congressional speech community is
found in the legislative history surrounding the creation of laws,
which includes the legislature’s publications and conversations.
The search for Congress’s intent leads through the valley of the
shadow of legislative history.

“There’s a notion I’d like to see buried: the ordinary person. Ridiculous. There is no ordinary
person.” ALAN MOORE & DAVE GIBBONS, WATCHMEN: THE DELUXE EDITION 379 (2013).
56. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 817 nn.127–28 and accompanying text (quoting
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1090–
91 (2017)).
57. “This choice is made tacitly in legal analysis but becomes overt when the analysis
involves linguistic corpora, because the software displays the provenance of the usage on a
screen in front of the researcher.” LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS
AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 78 (2010).
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C. Toward a More Perfect Statutory Interpretation
As noted above, defining ordinary meaning is one of the more
difficult questions of statutory interpretation: What does ordinary
meaning mean?58 There are several possible answers: First, it could
be the ordinary congressional meaning—what Congress intended;
second, it could be the ordinary public meaning—what the public
heard. These are the traditional answers. This Note proposes a third
answer: ordinary meaning is not merely what Congress said or
what the public heard, but rather something in the middle: what
they together understood.59 This is the ideal situation—when the
public and intended meanings overlap completely. Analyzing the
ideal statutory situation requires acknowledging that language
only has meaning in a specific context and speech community.
Thus, the shared statutory speech community must include both
Congress and the public.
II. CONTEXTUAL USES OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
When interpreting a statute, the Court looks first to the enacted
text. When the statute is clear, “[a]ll judges follow a simple rule . . .

58. Mouritsen noted, “When jurists speak of ‘ordinary meaning,’ they simply are not
always talking about the same thing.” Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1952; see generally Lee &
Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 798 (“Ironically, we have no ordinary meaning of ‘ordinary
meaning.’ The same goes for ‘plain meaning.’”) (footnote omitted).
59. Mouritsen stated that “[o]rdinary meaning has been characterized as ‘what . . .
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English’ or how words ‘sound in
the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words.’” Mouritsen, supra note 19, at
1953 (footnote omitted). Thus, “[t]hese two characterizations are not identical. The skilled
user of words and the normal speaker of English are not necessarily the same person.” Id.
These two characterizations’ differences do not end with the respective skill of the user.
There is a difference between “what . . . words . . . mean in the mouth” and how they “sound
in the mind[.]” Id. Mouritsen also noted “both of these characterizations are grounded in the
same principle, that ordinary meaning can be understood and analyzed in the context of
ordinary usage.” Id. Yet while ordinary meaning and ordinary usage are so closely related
that they are frequently compounded—they are not synonymous. “Almost certainly without
intending to, judges who have invoked this ‘ordinary-meaning-as-common-usage’
characterization have implicated not merely a theory of ordinary meaning, but also a method
for its analysis.” Id. at 1954. Unlike more qualitative notions of ordinary meaning, “the
question of the ‘common usage’ of a statutory term may be answered quantifiably through
a linguistic methodology called corpus linguistics.” Id.
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apply it.”60 The Supreme Court has held that “[a]s always, we begin
with the text of the statute.”61 Clear texts, however, are seldom
litigated. Rather, the texts that make it to court are “ambiguous, or
conflict[ed], or are so old that a once-clear meaning has been lost
because of changes in the language or legal culture.”62 When the
text is unclear, additional context is required to interpret the text.
In fact, the text’s meaning can never be determined if divorced
completely from context.63 And one of the most important ways to
determine a statute’s context is by using legislative history:
“[S]tatutes first gain meaning within the context that gave them life:
the give and take of the legislative process[, so] we must read
[them] within the context of the legislative process, which is
reflected in the statute’s legislative history.”64 Whereas the text is
the law enacted by the legislature, context merely attempts to help
the interpreter see how the legislature understood the language
it used.
Legislative history can provide two different contexts relevant
to statutory interpretation: policy-based context (how a reasonable
person solves problems) and semantic context (how a reasonable

60. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994).
61. Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483, 488 (2007); see also Neb. Dep’t of Revenue v.
Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123, 128 (1994).
62. Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 61.
63. See Manning, supra note 30, at 70. It is important to distinguish searching for the
context in which words are used from searching for the intent of the author. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes said that “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what
the statute means.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 417, 419 (1899). Textualists have found an uneasy compromise with using legislative
history by emphasizing its use as a revealer of context, but not of intent. Easterbrook noted,
“Legislative history helps us learn what Congress meant by what it said, but it is not a source
of legal rules competing with those found in the U.S. Code.” In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344
(7th Cir. 1989).
64. Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory
Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 328 (2004).

1134

J. MILLER_PAA.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1119

3/4/19 4:38 PM

Out of Many, One

person uses words).65 While each context is valuable,66 they are
given different weight by the competing interpretive camps.67
Purposivists favor policy-based context, while textualists lend
greater weight to semantic context.68

65. Manning, supra note 30, at 92–96. There may be other forms of context that do not
precisely follow these forms. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 2, at 1615–16 (detailing Professor
Nourse’s theory of procedural context). “When Congress passes a statute, it does so against
a background context of rules, procedures and deliberation. That context does not exist in
anyone’s head: it is public and constitutionally sanctioned. For years, we have called this
context by the term ‘legislative history.’” Id. Thus, a group, such as Congress, recognizes as
a group action that which has been “authorized by the group or part of that group’s
organization or procedure.” Id. at 1626. The group’s intent is manifested by its actions as
determined by its procedures. In a similar vein, a criminal case focuses on the accused’s
actions to determine intent. Id. at 1628. Thus, groups may have an intent through the
procedures the group has created. The creation of documents in the legislative history are
governed by procedural rules and reveal an intent as a series of decisions culminating in the
creation of a law.
66. For example, when the eighth-grade student in Anytown, U.S.A., is frustrated by
one of Charles Dickens’s texts, the ever-patient English teacher tirelessly instructs her in the
context of Dickens’s world. The distinction between policy-based context and semantic
context is the difference between understanding the horrors of the Industrial Revolution that
Dickens excoriated (policy-based) and the way Victorian English was used (semantic).
67. For example, Justice Sotomayor said that legislative history can be a “particularly
reliable source to which we can look to ensure our fidelity to Congress’ intended meaning.”
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)). But Justice Thomas retorted that “Even
assuming a majority of Congress read the Senate Report, agreed with it, and voted for [the
bill] with the same intent, “we are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by
what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.” Id. at 783 (quoting Lawson v. FMR
LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 459–60 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
Newcomers Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh seem to share Justice Thomas’s concern.
Justice Gorsuch wrote, “while pre-enactment practice ‘can be relevant to the interpretation
of an ambiguous text’ it has no force when the text is clear” because “whatever the legislative
history may or may not suggest about Congress’s collective ‘intent’ (putting aside the
difficulties of trying to say anything definitive about the intent of 535 legislators and the
executive . . .), the law before us that survived the gauntlet of bicameralism and presentment
couldn’t be plainer.” United States v. Games-Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012)
(denying reh’g en banc) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Kavanaugh introduces an additional
nuance to the legislative history debate: his principal concern seems to be that “[t]he clarityversus-ambiguity trigger for resorting to legislative history in the first place means that the
decision is often indeterminate. That, in turn, greatly exacerbates the problems with the use
of legislative history.” Brett Kavanaugh, The Role of the Judiciary in Maintaining the Separation
of Powers, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the
-role-the-judiciary-maintaining-the-separation-powers.
68. Few interpreters will exclusively rely on legislative history, acknowledging that
the text is the primary source of law and the clearest indication of legislative intent. JELLUM
& HRICIK, supra note 6, at 222. Still, legislative history has been much maligned by textualist
judges. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Divining Congress’s Intent, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2012),
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A. Policy-based Context
The search for policy-based context reflects Justice Marshall’s
statement that “[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of
the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be
derived . . . .”69 Policy-based context includes evidence such as
public knowledge of the evil the legislators intended to address;
policies reflected in a statute’s preamble, title, or structure; and
policies expressed in similar statutes.70 This evidence may also be
found in the legislative history.
For example, the majority in Muscarello used statements from
the floor debates to advance their argument that the statute in
question, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), was passed “‘to persuade the man
who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at
home.’”71 These statements included one representative who said
that the statute would apply to “the man who goes out taking a gun
to commit a crime”72 Another representative said, “Of course, what
we are trying to do by these penalties is to persuade the criminal to
leave his gun at home.”73 Still another stated, “We are concerned . . .
with having the criminal leave his gun at home.”74 The Muscarello
Court assumed these statements adequately represented the
statute’s policy-based context. The Court then aligned its definition
of the relevant term, carry, with these statements.

(“Scalia says that ‘examining the entrails of legislative history’ is a fool’s errand. He has
denounced the practice of looking at committee reports, floor debates and legislative
pronouncements for decades. Several years ago he offered a distillation of his view that
judges should look only to the language of the law Congress passed. ‘The statute is what
Congress voted on, not what some committee member said he thought it meant,’ Scalia said.
‘I don’t care what he thought it meant, since the rest of the Congress didn’t know what he
thought it meant when they voted for the law.’”). Even to the point that consultation of
legislative history in Supreme Court opinions as a whole has decreased drastically since the
1980s. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns
of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 220 (2006).
69. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
70. Manning, supra note 30, at 93.
71. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (citing 114 CONG. REC. 22,231
(1968) (statement of Rep. Poff)).
72. 114 CONG. REC. 22,243–44 (1968) (statement of Rep. Hunt).
73. Id. at 22,244 (statement of Rep. Randall).
74. Id. at 22,236 (statement of Rep. Meskill).
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Two of the chief criticisms textualists raise against using
legislative history for policy-based context are that (1) legislative
history is not actually the law, and (2) even if it were the law,
Congress has no single intent—rather, it is best described as a
“they” not an “it.”75 First, textualists assert that legislative history
is not actually the law, and “it is not to be supposed that, in signing
a bill the President endorses the whole Congressional Record.”76
After all, if interpreters did care about subjective congressional
intent, it would violate notice. One frequently cited example in
support of this theory is a legend surrounding the infamous Roman
emperor Caligula who ordered that his laws be written in tiny print
and posted on high pillars, thus preventing the Roman citizens
from knowing the laws to which they were subject.77
Second, some of the most vehement criticism of legislative
history is in response to the assumption that Congress had any
intent on a specific issue,78 the argument being that meaning is
found “not in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in the
understanding of the objectively reasonable person.”79 In short, the
battle cry of the textualists could be summed up in the statement:
“Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”80 Finally, there is also the worry
that legislative history is susceptible to manipulation or “salting the

75. Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and
Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161,
162–63 (1996). But see Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 73 (2012) (Comparing legislative history to
case law, Professor Nourse responds by stating that “[n]o lawyer would confuse a dissent
with a majority opinion, or pleadings with jury instructions, and yet the equivalent occurs
regularly in standard judicial and scholarly legislative histories. Scholars and law students
dismantle congressional reports and debates as if early reports (at the pleading stage) were
interchangeable with much-altered bills (jury instructions) and as if statements of those who
lost the debate (dissenting opinions) amount to authoritative statements of meaning
(majority opinions).”).
76. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
77. PETER HAY, THE BOOK OF LEGAL ANECDOTES 236 (1989).
78. Justice Holmes remarked that “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we
ask only what the statute means.” Holmes, supra note 63.
79. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 65.
80. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992).
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record.”81 One of the chief criticisms of using legislative history to
form interpretive opinions is that it amounts to little more than
scanning over a crowd to find one’s friends.82 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has characterized legislative history as “murky, ambiguous,
and contradictory.”83
B. Semantic Context
Although the legislative history surrounding a given statute
may appear “murky, ambiguous, and contradictory”84 when trying
to divine a policy or purpose, it is much clearer when uncovering
the semantic meaning. So even when James Madison decried using
the legislative history surrounding the drafting of the Constitution
to determine meaning, he acknowledged that it might still be
“presumptive evidence of the general understanding at the time of
the language used.”85 Legislative history thus has “semantic value
when the materials are cited as evidence of how terms were used and
what assumptions were made” by the legislature.86 These assumptions are reflected in the legislative history by the legislature’s
usage and habits of speech,87 “[b]ecause legislators and their staff
study how language can be manipulated, [and] that knowledge
shapes the meaning of the text chosen.”88 Thus, looking to semantic
context is similar to turning to a dictionary for a definition. In fact,

81. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 153–54. If the legislative history is
expanded beyond the statute in question to include the entire Congressional Record, the
probability of someone salting the record across multiple debates becomes an exceedingly
unlikely, and indeed, Herculean effort.
82. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal).
83. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
84. Id.
85. Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), reprinted in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). The Congressional Record collects
the language Congress produces, including floor statements, debates, bills, resolutions, and
motions proposed. Congressional Record, supra note 3.
86. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1315 (1998).
87. As proponents of legislative history assert, “[i]f the legislative process has its own
assumptions and word usages, the process itself should be the context within which we seek
a statute’s meaning.” McGreal, supra note 64, at 373.
88. JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 6, at 235.
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some interpreters have referred to the legislative history—and thus
the Congressional Record—as a specialized dictionary.89
Turning to the legislative history in this manner “at least may
alert the interpreter to the possible complexities of the language
used in the statute.”90 This is true because “[e]ven if the proper aim
of statutory interpretation is to seek ‘objective meaning’ rather than
‘subjective intent,’ knowing the legislative and other history surrounding enactment inevitably affects conclusions about what
those words—even . . . seemingly clear [words]—’objectively’
mean.”91 In other words, this use of legislative history represents
“meta-intent, or background understandings about language and
terminology (relevant to textualists) as well as values and norms
(relevant to normativists).”92
One aspect of congressional usage is reflected in the fact that
legislators “try to leave as little meaning to context as possible, at
times creating word usages that have no parallel in ordinary conversation.”93 Thus, the practice of arguing about meaning and looking to
the legislative history might encourage legislators to adopt usages
that are not employed by the ordinary public. Further, “[i]gnoring
legislative history” may actually “prevent[] the interpreter from
understanding the context in which the legislator used the words
written into the statutory text.”94 The interpreter is prevented from
understanding the meaning of the legislature’s words by ignoring
the history of the subject matter that “even without the legislative
history of the Act, helps inform our understanding of the way in
which the legislators used [the terms] in the statute.”95
A common example of using the legislative history to determine semantic context is to decide whether Congress used a term
in its ordinary or technical sense. In Nix v. Hedden,96 the Supreme
89. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1187 (2003).
90. Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in
Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 952 (2000).
91. Id.
92. Eskridge, supra note 46, at 1537.
93. McGreal, supra note 64, at 373 (emphasis added).
94. Chomsky, supra note 90, at 952.
95. Id.
96. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
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Court analyzed the classic fifth-grader’s question: Is a tomato a
vegetable or a fruit? Surprisingly, the Supreme Court determined
that a tomato is actually a vegetable for the purposes of the Tariff
Act of March 3, 1833.97 The Court noted, “Botanically speaking,
tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes,
beans, and peas. But in the common language of the people,
whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables.”98 In response to the Court’s holding, one might question
whether the Court should have looked to the legislative history to
see if members of Congress understood themselves to be using
terms such as “‘fruit’” in their ordinary or technical sense.
Looking for the context in which words are used is also a
familiar practice to determine trade usage in contracts. Judge
Easterbrook described trade usage as “meanings that members of
the trade or calling out of which the contract arose would attach to
apparently clear words, phrases, or sentences[.]”99 These meanings
“may be different from the meaning that these ‘clear’ terms bear in
ordinary discourse[.]”100 When a community beyond just the two
contracting parties uses a term in a specific manner, the usage
becomes “objectively verifiable” and “is evidence about what
words, phrases, etc. mean to a community, not merely to a pair of
individuals; it is evidence about a public, not a private, language—
evidence that is the equivalent, really, of a specialized dictionary.”101
This “specialized dictionary” use is another way that legislative
history can be used to study semantic context.102 Like a dictionary,
however, legislative history may provide a range of possible meanings while still failing to provide a determinant ordinary meaning
of the term. While dictionaries may be used without controversy as

97. The Court noted a similar question of whether beans were seeds: “Both are seeds
in the language of botany or natural history, but not in commerce nor in common parlance.”
Id. at 307 (citing Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414 (1889)).
98. Id.
99. Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1994).
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 89, at 1186–89.
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a matter of judicial notice,103 the definitions provided by legislative
history may not always be so reliable. Finally, dictionaries themselves have recently come under criticism when relied upon to
determine ordinary public meaning.104
Using legislative history is vulnerable to many of the same
pitfalls as using a dictionary. The problems inherent in using
dictionaries have been duly noted in the academic literature.105 One
such problem is confirmation bias.106 While many think that the
dictionary is an infallible fortress of meaning, it is important to
remember that each definition was selected by a person making a
conscious decision subject to confirmation bias. This conscious
decision is similar to asking a person on the street for the objective
meaning of a word. It may be difficult to get an accurate, representative definition from that one person. It is far easier to walk
down the street and listen for the way that word is repeatedly used
in context.107 In fact, this is the way children first acquire most of
their language.
Ironically, the usages given in the debate surrounding the
actual statute are the ones most likely to be distorted.108 This
distortion may be inadvertent or it may be the result of the
congressional speech community trying to “salt the record” to
103. Dictionaries may be used as a matter of judicial notice to define unknown terms
or to determine that a proposed definition is in fact a recorded linguistic possibility.
Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1921 n.44 and accompanying text.
104. See generally id. (expounding criticisms of using dictionaries to determine
ordinary meaning).
105. See id.; A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 72 (1994).
106. “[O]ur tendency [is] to selectively look for information that conforms to our
hypothesis and to overlook information that argues against it.” E. BRUCE GOLDSTEIN,
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: CONNECTING MIND, RESEARCH, AND EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE 374 (3d
ed. 2011).
107. This, of course, oversimplifies this method of language acquisition. Some words
are seldom said or are even restricted to narrow speech communities. Some words are even
restricted to specific streets. This is a problem that is frequently overlooked in our Internet
age that carries over into the problem of selecting a proper corpus. Have our speech
communities shrunk as widespread communication has increased?
108. See supra note 12. For this reason, the usage surrounding other statutes within the
same two-year congressional term more objectively reflects congressional usage. See
discussion infra Section IV.A.1.b for a more-detailed discussion of why the two-year
congressional term adequately reflects the congressional speech community while avoiding
the likelihood of distortion mentioned here.
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favor a particular interpretation when judges or agencies seek to
understand a statute. Indeed, the Congressional Record may contain
more than just the language of Congress. Justice Scalia warned that
committee reports are written “at best by a committee staff member
on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff
member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of
those references was not primarily to inform . . . Congress what the
bill meant . . . but rather to influence judicial construction.”109 For
these reasons, meaning can usually be most accurately determined
if the “definer” is unaware that she is being observed in her
language usage.110 Legislative history’s best use for interpretation
is thus not to discover how Congress defines a term, but rather how
Congress uses a term.111
Words only have meaning in a specific community and context.
If the shared statutory speech community is to be understood,
legislative history is a necessary piece of the puzzle, together with
public meaning. Ordinary congressional meaning is not just how
two parties (or two legislators) use a term, but rather how a
community (Congress) uses a term.112 If this is true, then it follows
that there is a strong chance that there are hidden nuggets of
congressional semantic meaning in the legislative record; the
problem is that interpreters cannot always distinguish the fool’s
gold from the genuine article.113

109. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
110. During contract formulation, however, the precise definition is determined while

the drafter is keenly aware of being observed.
111. Similarly, corpus linguistics analyzes how a word is used, not the definition it is
given. For example, finding the definition of the word “_____” in the dictionary as compared
to Professor Mascott’s using the dictionary as a corpus to find how the dictionary uses
“_____” to define other words. Mascott, supra note 12, at 1558–59.
112. See Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1994), for Judge Posner’s
discussion of trade usage.
113. These mistakes may be innocent or insidious. For example, in Muscarello v. United
States, Justice Breyer searched a newspaper database. 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998). Other judges
have done likewise; Judge Richard Posner “recognized the deficiencies of standard
methods—principally, dictionaries—in answering” which sense is most ordinary, “[s]o he
proceeded to a search for data, and he did so using the tool that is perhaps most familiar to
us today. He performed a Google search.” Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 799–800. Yet this
use is still susceptible to picking friends out of a crowd.
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III. FINDING A UNIFIED CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
THROUGH CORPUS LINGUISTICS
I believe that many of the concerns with using legislative
history to inform context—such as the difficulty of finding the
intent of a multimember body or having the record subject to
manipulation—can be resolved by looking at legislative history
data as a whole instead of referring to isolated data points. Thus,
the first step for interpreters seeking to resolve the selective use of
legislative history is to select and organize the appropriate body of
language, or corpus (plural corpora), into a lexical database. One
method of organizing a lexical database is through corpus
linguistics. These corpora can be created relatively simply with
freely available software, and lexical databases representing the
ordinary public meaning have already been created. These corpora
include the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA),114
the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA),115 and the
Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA).116
As noted above, while the ordinary public meaning is the most
traditional measure of congressional intent, it may not be the most
accurate. In fact, one criticism of these ordinary public meaning
corpora is that while the “point of a large data set is to avoid basing
conclusions on a few speakers’ idiosyncrasies . . . the idiosyncrasies
of the [legislature] constitute the rule of law[.]”117 This results in
“ignor[ing] the only speaker that matters” in an “attempt to eschew
the influence of any one speaker.”118
Two leaders in the law and corpus linguistics movement, Utah
Supreme Court Justice Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen,
theorized that there might be a corpus that “would reflect dialogue

114. COCA, supra note 16.
115. COHA, supra note 16.
116. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), BYU LAW: LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea

(last visited Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter COFEA].

117. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 21, 356 P.3d 1258, 1266 (internal quotations omitted).
118. Id. The majority’s assertion is an overstatement. Surely ordinary public meaning

matters to those governed by the law. And even for finding the meaning intended by
Congress, ordinary public meaning provides at least some evidence.
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among the 535 members [of the Congress] that voted on [a particular statute].”119 They continued on to posit that
[i]f we had such a corpus, and if it recorded extensive discussion
among [the members of Congress] about the [term] they were
talking about when they enacted this statute, we might be able to
get data of relevance to the intended meaning of this provision.
Perhaps it would reveal only examples of [one sense] and never
of [the other]. If so, that might tell us that the intended meaning is
limited to the former.120

If the Congressional Record were converted into a corpus, it
would allow an interpreter to empirically analyze ordinary
congressional word usage. Creating and analyzing this database is
possible through the nascent field of law and corpus linguistics.121
However, our expectations for corpus linguistics in general, and
this tool specifically, should be tempered, since “[e]mpirical
analysis of common usage will not by itself solve thorny questions
of statutory interpretation . . . .”122 Rather, corpus linguistics (and
the CRAC specifically) should be seen as just one of many useful
tools of statutory interpretation to help the interpreter make a more
informed decision.123
A. The Congressional Record as a Corpus
The Congressional Record contains “a substantially verbatim
account of the remarks made by senators and representatives while
they are on the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives. It also includes all bills, resolutions, and motions proposed,
as well as debates and roll call votes.”124 If it were possible to turn
the Congressional Record into a database, then this database would

119. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 854.
120. Id.
121. For a brief introduction to corpus linguistics in the legal context, see Mouritsen,

supra note 19, at 1954–66.
122. The Supreme Court 1997 Term, Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 365 (1998).
123. Id.
124. Congressional Record, supra note 3.
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be helpful in determining congressional usage,125 since it is a nearcomplete record of the congressional speech community.126
However, sifting through the entire legislative record to find
words in context is an infeasible, if not insurmountable, task. This
process can be simplified through corpus linguistics. “[I]t cannot be
denied,” notes one scholar, “that corpus linguistics is also
frequently associated with a certain outlook on language. At the
center of this outlook is that the rules of language are usage-based
and that changes occur when speakers use language to communicate with each other.”127 However, this outlook “must be
analyzed within some framework or understanding of ordinary
meaning.”128 The understanding of ordinary meaning posited
above requires a specialized corpus focused on the congressional
speech community.
In light of the lengthy list of corpora that already exist, a
specialized congressional corpus may seem superfluous. However,
125. This process is similar to the process of creating a dictionary: “The editors make
up this record by collecting examples of uses of the word to be defined, studying each use in
context, and then forming a judgment about the meaning in that context.” HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1190 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994). It might be
helpful to imagine the Congressional Record similarly: The interpreter “make[s] up this record
by collecting examples” of the legislators’ uses of the word in question, “studying each use
in context” (whether debate, committee report, etc.) before “forming a judgment about the
meaning in that context.” See id.
126. While the vast majority of the Congressional Record reflects the speech of Congress,
there are also some segments that come from congressional staffers, or even the public (e.g.,
letters from constituents). The potential for these sources to pollute the corpus is briefly
addressed in the conclusion. See Conclusion infra.
127. HANS LINDQUIST, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ENGLISH 1 (2009).
128. See Gries & Slocum, supra note 41, at 1441–42, for a discussion on some of the
ordinary meaning frameworks particularly relevant to corpus linguistics (“The concept
underlying corpus linguistics is also consistent with the idea that an ordinary meaning is one
that, in some sense, is general and cuts across contexts. Corpus-linguistic analyses are
‘always based on the evaluation of some kind of frequencies,’ and frequency is a crucial
aspect of what distinguishes an ordinary meaning from some meaning that is perhaps
grammatical but unordinary. Corpus linguistics can illustrate not only the number of senses
(i.e., meanings) a linguistic expression may have but also which meaning is most frequently
used. It can provide clues as to what the most prototypical meaning of an expression might
be based on various factors [highest frequency, most even dispersion, earliest acquired,
central in network of senses, meaning with the highest number of features with the highest
cue validities] . . . . Of course, corpus linguistics requires a (testable) conceptual leap from
frequencies to the issue being researched by the user. Thus, any corpus findings must be
analyzed within some framework or understanding of ordinary meaning.”).
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these generalized corpora may not be ideally suited for all
purposes: “For example, . . . a general corpus of online language
would be a poor choice if a researcher is interested in the technical
legal meaning of [a] term . . . .”129 If statutory interpretation
requires only what the statute means in the ear of the ordinary
person, then a generalized public meaning corpus is most likely
adequate to represent ordinary public meaning. But if statutory
meaning is more accurately represented by a shared statutory
speech community that includes ordinary congressional usage,
then a more specialized corpus is also needed.
B. Making a Corpus
Currently, “[l]inguistic corpora can be built from the ground up
using text or speech from any given speech community or
register.”130 A basic understanding of what goes into creating a
corpus is essential to evaluating the applicability of a particular
corpus to a given problem of statutory interpretation.131 When
creating a corpus, some of the most important characteristics to
consider are representativeness (or content) and size.132

129. James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing
Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus
Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1595 (2017). “While it is not necessarily
problematic to reuse a corpus for more than one study, it is critical to understand that a
corpus that is representative for one research purpose may be entirely the wrong corpus for
a different purpose.” Id.
130. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 832. For the purposes of this Note, corpora for
both sessions of the 90th Congress (1967 and 1968) were created using a freely available
corpus development software called AntConc. See AntConc Homepage, LAURENCE
ANTHONY’S WEBSITE, http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc (last visited
Jan. 19, 2018); 113 CONG. REC. (1967) (90th Cong., 1st Sess.); 114 CONG. REC. (1968) (90th
Cong., 2d Sess.).
131. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 129, at 1593–94. In addition, creating a corpus is not
out of reach for the average judge or attorney: “freely available software, such as AntConc,
enables researchers to analyze their own modestly-sized corpus.” Id. at 1593. Indeed, creating
a corpus is often intuitive, and a better understanding of corpus linguistics will offer a
marked improvement in determining meaning over mere intuition.
132. See Edward Finegan, Comments on James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law
and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis
Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1297, 1302–03 (2017);
Douglas Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora for General Language Studies, in 19
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 219, 240 (1993).

1146

J. MILLER_PAA.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1119

3/4/19 4:38 PM

Out of Many, One

1. Representativeness
A corpus should represent a given speech community. The
measure of representativeness in a corpus is “the extent to which a
sample includes the full range of variability in a population.”133
Representativeness is a daunting ideal, but it is not “all-ornothing.”134 Some scholars remind us that “[j]ust because it may not
be possible to design a perfectly representative corpus does not
mean we should not strive for that ideal . . . .”135
Following the insights gained from communications theory,136
the relevant speech community for statutory interpretation must
include both the public and Congress. Seeing as current corpora
focus on broader speech communities representing the ordinary
public meaning,137 it is propitious to create a legislative corpus to
use in conjunction with corpora such as COCA, COHA, or
COFEA.138 In fact, COFEA already approaches this ideal, including
documents such as “letters, diaries, sermons, speeches, debates, . . .
government materials, [and] legal documents” from the founding
members of Congress.139
Thus, at the very least, any corpus purporting to represent the
shared statutory speech community should include the Congressional Record in addition to “ordinary”140 texts such as transcripts of

133. Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, in 8 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC
COMPUTING 243, 243 (1993).
134. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 129, at 1594.
135. Id.
136. See supra Part I.
137. For example, “the NOW Corpus records the language use of a single, large speech
community (the United States) in a single linguistic register (newsprint).” Lee & Mouritsen,
supra note 8, at 834. Further, Lee and Mouritsen hypothesize that “if the interpretation of a
federal statute requires us to consider the linguistic norms and conventions of the citizens
subject to that statute, then U.S. newsprint may be the appropriate speech community and
register.” Id.
138. Or in the words of Dr. Seuss, “If I can’t find a [legislative corpus], I’ll make one
instead!” Cf. DR. SEUSS, HOW THE GRINCH STOLE CHRISTMAS 15 (1957) (noting that if one
cannot find something, one should make it).
139. James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original
Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21, 30 (2016).
COFEA also contains nonlegislative materials including “newspapers, court opinions, . . .
pamphlets, broadsides, non-fiction books, and fiction writing from the Founding Era.” Id.
These different registers, however, can be excluded from any search.
140. COCA, supra note 16.
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spoken English and written “fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic texts.”141 Otherwise, only one side of the
conversation is being represented.
2. Size
One of the most important considerations when creating a
corpus is size: “Corpus size is incredibly important, in terms of the
richness of the corpus data. A tiny one million word corpus is
extremely limited in terms of the phenomena that it can study—
compared to a 400 million word corpus, where there might be 400
times as much data.”142 For example, one of the most popular
corpora,143 the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)
“contains more than 560 million words of text (20 million words
each year 1990–2017) and it is equally divided among spoken
[English], fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic
texts.”144 Another corpus, the Corpus of Founding Era American
English (COFEA), contains more than 150 million words.145
The Congressional Record could be used as a corpus by breaking
it into individual speech communities of two years. The two-year
interval is most adequate because the senators and representatives
comprising the speech community change every two years.146 The
Congressional Record begins when the new legislators are sworn in
and a new session of Congress begins. While the body of Congress
may change slightly in the interim due to resignations or deaths, I
am assuming that those changes are relatively infrequent and
insignificant. On each page of the Congressional Record there are
141. Id. Advocating the inclusion of the Congressional Record with natural language
documents is similar to Jennifer L. Mascott’s idea to include Founding Era dictionaries in the
Corpus of Founding Era American English. See Mascott, supra note 12, at 1588. (“As COFEA
is developed, founding era dictionaries perhaps should be included alongside the corpus’s
natural language documents.”).
142. Size, CORPUS.BYU.EDU, https://corpus.byu.edu/size.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
143. “The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) is the largest freelyavailable corpus of English, and the only large and balanced corpus of American English.
COCA is probably the most widely-used corpus of English, and it is related to many other
corpora of English that we have created, which offer unparalleled insight into variation in
English.” COCA, supra note 16.
144. Id.
145. COFEA, supra note 116.
146. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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approximately 1385 words. Multiplied by approximately 25,951
pages per volume147 equals about 36,000,000 words per volume.
With two sessions in each year of Congress, the Congressional Record
contains approximately 70,000,000 words per year. Finally, the
composition of legislators changes every two years, so the speech
community is valid for two-year periods, creating a corpus of
approximately 140,000,000 words. Thus, each two-year minicorpus would include approximately 140,000,000 words.
C. Possible Criticisms of the Congressional Record
as Corpus Approach148
This approach is not without its flaws. Some of these flaws are
common to all corpora, others to legislative history, and still others
arise because of uniting the two. First, various criticisms of corpus
linguistics in general have been advanced. One scholar mentioned
several of these criticisms; namely, that a corpus (1) cannot present
a full picture of the speech community analyzed, (2) may be
anachronistic, and (3) may not be representative.149 While many of
these criticisms break down when applied to using the Congressional Record as a corpus, new potential problems arise to take their
place. These will also be considered.
1. Full picture of speech community analyzed
The first of these criticisms is that no corpus can present a full
picture of the speech community analyzed. Mouritsen counters this
criticism by noting that this is only a valid concern when the
legislature “has regulated certain conduct using highly specialized
language.”150 In other words, the assumption is that the legislature
speaks, or at least should be interpreted, in terms the ordinary
person would readily understand.
147. The number of pages per volume has varied over time. For example, the first
volume of the Congressional Record contains 5500 pages. 1 CONG. REC. (1874).
148. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 865–73, for a thorough discussion of various
criticisms of law and corpus linguistics. (“The criticisms that we have considered fall into
three categories: proficiency, propriety, and practicality. Each concern has an element of
viability but crumbles under careful scrutiny.”).
149. Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1966–70.
150. Id. at 1967.
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Using the Congressional Record as a corpus resolves this concern
even more conclusively because the Congressional Record is actually
a rare occurrence of a near-complete record of the speech community analyzed: “The Congressional Record is a substantially verbatim
account of the remarks made by senators and representatives while
they are on the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives. It also includes all bills, resolutions, and motions proposed,
as well as debates and roll call votes.”151
2. Anachronism
The second concern is that certain corpora may be anachronistic.152 While this concern has largely been remedied with the
introduction of COHA, as a broader corpus than COCA, COHA
still contains fewer words.153 While COCA contains a great number
of words (spanning only from 1990 to the present), COHA covers a
much longer period of time. One possible reason for a corpus to
become anachronistic is that corpora must be updated regularly to
stay current. The CRAC does not face this challenge because each
two-year mini-corpus will represent the complete usage for that
period. Even as new congressional sessions come every year,
keeping the corpora divided into relevant two-year chunks will
ensure they never become anachronistic.
3. Representativeness
The third criticism combines with the first with respect to the
CRAC. For most corpora, it is clear that a full picture of the speech
community analyzed is impossible, so representativeness is a
measure of how accurate the chosen sample will be. In the CRAC,

151. Congressional Record, supra note 3.
152. Inexplicably, this does not seem to be a concern when turning to a dictionary. See

Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1945–46 (“[D]ictionary editors . . . are likely to ‘give
disproportionate attention to uncommon [uses],’ and to favor the language use—likely the
anachronistic language use—of ‘prestigious authors’ (like the Muscarello Court’s Defoe
and Melville).”).
153. Before COHA, one critic wrote that “[u]ntil this deficit is supplied, the [corpus]
approach . . . is not practicable for old statutes.” Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New
Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2219 (2003).
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the entire record of the speech community is included. Thus, the
sample size is also the entire community.
Yet while the CRAC may contain all the official written and oral
transcripts of Congress, technically it is nevertheless still incomplete.154 This is because “[g]iven the infinite permutability of
human language, the corpus can never capture every possible
human utterance.” This remains true “even in a narrowly-defined
speech community,”155 such as the United States Congress. Thus,
the language that remains unrecorded will obviously not be
represented in the corpus.
IV. APPLICATION: MUSCARELLO V. UNITED STATES
Corpus linguistics is most helpful in cases of lexical, as opposed
to structural, ambiguity involving two (or more) competing definitions. Muscarello v. United States,156 is perhaps the quintessential
example of the ideal candidate for corpus analysis.157 The debate in
Muscarello surrounded part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, which states in part:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for
five years . . . .158

Muscarello faced a five-year minimum for purchasing
marijuana while his handgun remained locked in his glovebox.159
The prosecution insisted that carries a firearm includes conveying it
154. There may be additional ways to expand the database of congressional usage—
members of Congress’s tweets, posts, articles, etc. But these outside statements may not be
representative of congressional speech if a congresswoman is only a congresswoman when
acting officially. In other words, it might be most representative to limit congressional speech
to what occurs in the constitutionally mandated processes and not on social media.
155. Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1969.
156. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
157. Muscarello has been extensively analyzed beginning with Mouritsen’s article. See
Mouritsen, supra note 19. Lee and Mouritsen then followed up on Mouritsen’s initial analysis
in a subsequent article. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
159. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 125–26.
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in a vehicle. Muscarello argued that the phrase is limited to carrying it on one’s person.160
The Supreme Court engaged in a battle of meaning, with the
majority firing off with the King James Bible, Robinson Crusoe, and
Moby Dick, as well as two electronic newspaper databases and
several unabridged dictionaries.161 The dissent’s answering salvo
included a legal dictionary, several alternative translations of the
Bible, and works of poetry.162 Their barrage continued with television and movie quotes from The Magnificent Seven, M*A*S*H,163
and even Sesame Street.164 When the dust settled, the majority
declared that “the phrase ‘carries a firearm’ is [not] limited to the
carrying of firearms on the person,” but extends to “a person who
knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle[.]”165
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, this war of the words left many
unsatisfied, including some on the Court: “Unlike the Court, I do
not think dictionaries, surveys of press reports, or the Bible tell us,
dispositively, what ‘carries’ means embedded in § 924(c)(1).”166
A. Analyzing Ordinary Public Meaning in Muscarello
Using COCA, COHA, and NOW
One scholar, Stephen Mouritsen, expressed doubts about the
methodology in Muscarello.167 Using corpus linguistics and the
COCA and COHA, he determined that the Court’s broad
interpretation, carry in a vehicle (carry1), is in fact less commonly
used than the narrow interpretation, carry on a person (carry2).168
Mouritsen found that “[v]irtually all of the concordance lines
returned . . . featured uses of carry related to the physical carrying
of an object, though it could not always be determined whether

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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Id.
Id. at 129–30.
Id. at 143–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 144 n.6.
Id. at 147 n.11.
Id. at 126–27 (majority opinion).
Id. at 142–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See generally Mouritsen, supra note 19.
Id. at 1964–65.

J. MILLER_PAA.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

3/4/19 4:38 PM

1119

Out of Many, One

carry1, or carry2, was intended.”169 So Mouritsen grouped his results
into four categories: carry1, carry2, either, and neither.170
Figure 1 — COCA171
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Figure 2 — COHA172

Drawing upon this data, Mouritsen noted, “It is important to
pause here and observe what these data do and do not tell us.”173
He asserts that it would be “arbitrary” to conclude that § 924(c)
should be interpreted as carry2 just because it is the most frequent
use.174 While carry2 is arguably the ordinary public meaning, that
doesn’t necessarily mean Congress intended carry2. Again, corpus
linguistics does not resolve questions on the battlefield of interpretive theory, it just clears the fog of war.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1964.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1968.
Id. at 1964.
Id.
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Since the purpose of the legislation (at least in the mind of one
senator) was to “persuade the man who is tempted to commit a
federal felony to leave his gun at home,”175 perhaps Congress
intended a broader meaning of carry. The imperative, do not carry a
firearm, may thus include both carry1 and carry2. If the purpose is to
decrease gun violence, it makes little difference to the legislature
whether the gun is in the felon’s hand, purse, or glovebox. On the
other hand, Congress’s purpose may have been narrower: to deter
the kind of carrying most likely to lead to violence.176 Although the
public is likely to use carry only to refer to carrying a firearm on
one’s person—it does not follow that the public expects a
sophisticated speaker like Congress to use the term in the same
way. In fact, Mouritsen and Lee found in a subsequent article, using
the News on the Web (NOW) corpus, that while carry2 is the most
common public use, carry1 is also a possible use (albeit far
less common).177
B. Analyzing Ordinary Congressional Meaning
in Muscarello Using CRAC
While carry2 may be the more ordinary public meaning, 178 it is
not necessarily the more ordinary congressional meaning. To
answer this question, I created a corpus from the Congressional
Record. The first step was to download the Congressional Record for
both sessions of the 90th Congress, 1967 and 1968, from
HeinOnline. 179 I then plugged this data for the 90th Congress into
AntConc, a freely available tool for analyzing corpora. Clicking
the word list tab revealed that this particular corpus contains
323,667 different words (word types) and 118,522,349 individual
words (word tokens).
One challenge with creating a custom corpus is that it is not
tagged like COCA or COHA would be. This means that more
specialized, time-saving searches are not possible. Instead of being

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 133 (1998).
Id. at 144–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 848.
If the interpreter can even decide what ordinary meaning means. See supra note 59.
The downloaded files for 1967 and 1968 are collected here: https://tinyurl.com
/outofmanyonecorpusdata.
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able to limit to verb uses (search term is “[carry].[v*]”), I had to
manually comb through the 54,118 concordance lines to find 1080
concordance lines using carry as a verb with a firearm of some sort
(including the term weapon(s)). From these lines, I randomly
selected 100 lines to review more closely. I limited these lines to
those in which carry (or one of its derivatives) co-occurred with
words such as firearm(s), gun(s), pistol(s), handgun(s), or rifles(s).180
Like Mouritsen, I grouped the results into four categories: carry1,
carry2, either, and neither. The results are included below in
Figure 3.
Figure 3 — CRAC181
carry1 vehicle

carry2 person

either

neither

firearm(s)

6

7

25

0

gun(s)

4

5

11

0

rifle(s)

1

2

1

0

pistol

2

7

11

0

weapon(s)

0

2

9

0

total

13

25

62

0

C. Analyzing Ordinary Statutory Meaning in Muscarello
Using Both Ordinary Public Meaning and Ordinary
Congressional Meaning Corpora
When the COCA, COHA, NOW, and CRAC corpora are
compared, both usages of carry are frequent. In fact, as compared

180. Mouritsen excluded weapon(s), “even though the term appears among the tophundred collocates of carry. Though all firearms are weapons, the reverse is not true and a
preliminary examination of weapon(s) in the corpus suggested that many if not most of the
weapons referenced were not firearms.” Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1963 n.250. In my
corpus, however, because nearly all the weapon(s) referenced were firearms, I did not
exclude the term. Also, I included the terms derringer, six-shooter, and handgun with pistol(s);
the terms carbine and shotgun with rifle(s); the term long gun with gun(s); and the term arm(s)
with firearm(s). There were also seven concordance lines that included more than one term. I
counted these in the overall total of whether the line best supported carry1, carry2, either, or
neither. But I did not assign the lines to an individual term.
181. See supra note 180. The concordance lines are available here: https://tinyurl.com
/outofmanyonecorpusdata.
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to the ordinary public meaning results represented in Figure 1 and
Figure 2, the ordinary congressional usage of carry1 and carry2 is
roughly equal. Thus, while it may be more colloquial to use carry to
refer to carrying a firearm on one’s person, Congress is equally likely to use either meaning. If the congressional and public meanings
had aligned, then the interpreter would have a strong argument for
choosing the aligned meaning. But even though there has been a
communication breakdown between the congressional speech community and the public speech community, comparing ordinary public meaning and ordinary congressional meaning corpora is helpful.
Since Congress is just as likely to use either meaning, and the
public favors carry2 as the most common meaning, the interpreter
might conclude that carry2 is the best meaning. On the other hand,
since the public also recognizes carry1 as a possible meaning, the
interpreter could conclude the statutory meaning should encompass both terms. Ultimately, the interpreter is left with a pure choice
of interpretive legal theory. Since there is not a clear consensus of
meaning, the interpreter must choose between focusing on promoting notice with the more ordinary meaning of carry referring to
just on one’s person, or the congressional meaning of carrying on
either one’s person or in a vehicle. But comparing the corpora in
this way still empirically demonstrates that there is not a clear
consensus between the public and Congress on what carry means.
Thus, when the interpreter decides on a normative preference, it
will at least be a transparent decision.182
CONCLUSION
As the field of law and corpus linguistics continues to develop,
different corpora can be created to represent and compare different
speech communities. And these corpora can help academics and
judges be transparent in fundamental decisions of legal theory
involving notice and congressional intent. Thus, anyone on the
ideological statutory interpretation spectrum can benefit by
carefully considering what corpus linguistics has to offer.

182. See supra note 22.
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It is important to note that the CRAC corpus is polluted to some
extent. The corpus should reflect the relevant speech community,
which at a minimum is the 535 members of Congress and at the
maximum might include the entire congressional staff.183 Yet the
Congressional Record contains some documents that are not
authored by Congress, such as letters from the public that are
occasionally appended to the Congressional Record. I attempted to
filter them out manually, but it is clear that for this to be a viable
project going forward, a more carefully constructed corpus with all
texts from the ordinary public removed must be created. However,
I hope that this Note’s contribution sparks further analysis and
scholarship on the interplay between ordinary public meaning and
ordinary congressional meaning. Harmonizing them will allow
interpreters to study the shared statutory speech community and
more accurately define and describe ordinary meaning.
Justin A. Miller*

183. Though the staff members do not enact laws, they closely associate with the lawmakers every day, and I assume that their conversations with the lawmakers reflect a similar
vernacular and usage in the course of congressional duties.
* J.D. candidate, April 2019, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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